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Research on global programs to regulate labor standards has emphasized interactions between 
transnational and state regulatory institutions.  If transnational initiatives can make state 
institutions more relevant, global efforts have the potential to reinforce, rather than displace, state 
labor regulation.  Through a study of the Indonesia-based program of a leading initiative to 
improve working conditions in the garment industry, Better Work, this paper identifies the 
conditions under which transnational regulations reinforce domestic ones.  Drawing on two case 
studies comparing regulations governing fixed-term contracts and minimum wage renegotiations 
in four Indonesian districts, we find that reinforcement is likely when two conditions jointly 
occur: unions mobilize to activate state institutions, and transnational regulators have support to 
resolve ambiguities in formal rules in ways that require firms to engage with constraining 
institutions. We further test the relationship between these conditions and reinforcement through 
a quantitative analysis of factory participation in state supervised wage renegotiations.  Our 
findings reveal opportunities and constraints to designing global programs that can both improve 
factory-level standards and support the functioning of state labor market institutions.  
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Transnational regulatory initiatives created by non-state actors have proliferated 
throughout the world, but these initiatives alone are insufficient to improve labor standards in the 
long run.  Meaningful change will require understanding how these global efforts can reinforce, 
rather than weaken, existing state institutions.  Scholars have uncovered instances of positive 
interactions between the global and the local, but there have been few attempts to explain 
variation in how transnational initiatives interact with state regulation.  As a result, we lack 
essential knowledge necessary to design transnational initiatives that support local institutions, as 
well as an understanding of when positive interactions might, or might not, be possible.   
Through a study of the Indonesia-based program of a leading initiative in the garment 
industry, Better Work, this paper seeks to identify the conditions under which transnational 
initiatives reinforce domestic institutions.  Our analysis draws on puzzling variation: Better 
Work Indonesia (BWI) sometimes reinforces state institutions, such as by pushing factories to 
participate in state supervised wage renegotiations, but in other instances it has little impact on 
how factories interact with the state.  To account for this variation, we turn to the ways in which 
BWI is embedded in domestic politics, focusing on two factors: worker mobilization and support 
from key stakeholders for authoritative interpretations of rules that require factories to engage 
with constraining state institutions.  
Beyond the critical question of how to improve the functioning of labor regulation in 
global supply chains, our analysis explores regulatory interactions in contexts of institutional 
weakness.  Theories of institutional change suggest that layering—the adoption of new rules 
alongside existing ones (e.g. private pensions Pierson 1994)—in advanced industrial countries 
can either draw support away from the status quo or amplify actors’ interests in maintaining the 
original institution.  Likewise, transnational supply chain initiatives are layered over state rules.  
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Yet, we should not presume that layering plays out in the same way in countries with weak 
institutions. In such contexts, the critical question is not how two strong institutions compete for 
dominance, but whether layering can make weak institutions more relevant.  By developing 
hypotheses for how and why institutional interactions can help turn formal state rules into 
constraints that actually structure actors’ behavior, we can understand institutional interactions in 
a much broader set of cases. 
Indonesia is an ideal context for this research.  First, Indonesia is an important site of 
global garment production. Though not on a rapid growth trajectory, Indonesia ranks among the 
top fifteen global clothing exporters, with $7.7 billion in 2013.2  The presence of garment 
factories that supply global brands has attracted transnational initiatives, including BWI, to 
regulate the industry.  Second, Indonesian labor politics are highly dynamic. While unions 
remain fragmented and weak by international standards (union density is 4-5%), they have 
gained political power through massive protests and won reforms that have made Indonesian 
labor laws among the strongest in the region (Caraway 2006; Ford 2009; Juliawan 2011; 
Aspinall 2013; Caraway and Ford 2014).  Despite these gains, enforcement is weak, and 
employers routinely violate laws regarding workplace contracts and wages.  
The combination of these developments—dynamic labor politics and transnational 
initiatives—provides an opportunity to examine their interaction.  A third feature of Indonesia—
decentralization—makes this context particularly compelling.  Much contestation over labor 
market institutions takes place at the district (local) level. District governments control the local 
offices of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration that are involved in setting minimum 
wages and enforcing labor laws.  BWI has the potential to reinforce these local-level institutions 
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in each district where it operates, thus creating variation in the outcome of interest. 
Decentralization also provides a methodological advantage by bringing into sharp relief 
differences within national states.  Much of the literature on regulatory interactions treats states 
as unitary—positing that transnational initiatives either have positive or negative interactions 
with the state as a whole—yet all states are internally heterogeneous when it comes to regulatory 
enforcement.  Decentralization in Indonesia amplifies internal differences, allowing us to 
uncover not only the conditions under which reinforcement obtains but also which parts of the 
state are reinforced. 
Regulatory Interactions 
 Regulatory institutions shape labor markets and working conditions by serving two key 
functions.  First, they block abusive practices, such as forced overtime.  Second, they serve as 
structures in which struggles between labor and management occur, moving contestation out of 
informal and individualized arenas.  Rather than prescribing specific outcomes, this second 
category of process institutions conditions the power of labor and management to influence 
outcomes like wages and workplace standards.  Yet, in many developing countries institutions 
are “weak” and often fail to structure behavior (Levitsky and Murillo 2013).  In such contexts, 
informal practices tend to prevail: firms either defect from state institutions altogether, or corrupt 
the process so that formal rules do not constrain behavior.  Moreover, there are often substantial 
ambiguities as to what the rules of the game actually are. 
Labor markets in global production systems are regulated by both states and transnational 
initiatives.  Transnational initiatives include “private” programs, such as the Fair Labor 
Association, and hybrid ones that involve firms, non-governmental organizations, and 
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international organizations.  Better Work is a particular hybrid form that includes buyers and 
international organizations, as well as national employer associations, unions, and governments.  
First established in Cambodia as an ILO initiative to monitor labor rights for the U.S.-Cambodia 
Textile Agreement, Better Work has since spread to seven other countries (Rossi, Luinstra, and 
Pickles 2014).  Unlike states, transnational initiatives derive their power in large part from 
companies and non-governmental organizations.  Yet just as state regulatory institutions are 
weak, so too do transnational regulations fail to consistently structure the behavior of employers. 
Research has repeatedly shown that domestic political and social context greatly influences their 
performance (Locke 2013). 
A central question has thus become how transnational initiatives interact with state 
institutions, and in particular whether layering the two types of regulation can contribute to 
change (Vogel 2008; Eberlein et al. 2014; Büthe 2010; Berliner et al. 2015).  Layering can lead 
to negative interactions if the new institution “siphon[s] off the support of key constituencies” of 
the old one (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 23).  Indeed, critics have argued that states could 
effectively cede power to transnational initiatives, causing actors to stop investing in state 
regulation (Esbenshade 2004; Seidman 2007).  By contrast, layering can also result in positive 
interactions, where the presence of one institution makes the other more consequential, 
encouraging actors to invest political capital in supporting it (Hall 2001).  Reinforcement is a 
strong positive interaction whereby transnational regulators push actors into domestic institutions 
that effectively constrain behavior.   
Reinforcement is particularly important because it makes state institutions more relevant 
and likely to shape actors’ behavior and expectations.  For instance, institutions that structure 
wage bargaining may remain weak because firms do not see it in their interest to participate in 
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tripartite negotiations; instead employers might simply ignore legally-mandated wages or 
informally negotiate with workers.  By contrast, if transnational regulators make participation in 
the interest of employers, for example by requiring them to use state dispute resolution processes, 
state institutions become more relevant.  In this way, the presence of transnational regulators 
creates incentives to invest in state institutions, rather than avenues to defect. 
Under what conditions do transnational regulators reinforce state institutions?  Here the 
literature has less to say—scholars have focused more on characterizing interactions than on 
explaining why they occur; and when they do explain interactions, the focus is more on the 
standards aspects of institutions than the processes (exceptions are Bartley 2011; Locke, Rissing,  
and Pal 2012).  To preview our analysis, we argue that two conditions make reinforcement likely.  
The first is worker mobilization targeting the state, which creates public contestation over the 
rules and pushes the state to take pro-worker actions, such as stricter enforcement or support for 
higher wages.  Mobilization affects transnational regulators indirectly: unions pressure 
government regulators to activate state institutions, creating public conflicts that then must be 
addressed by transnational regulators in factories.  By contrast, without mobilization, 
transnational regulators attempt to resolve violations without engaging in the state in a 
meaningful way.  Quite simply, managers are told to adopt (or cease) a particular practice 
without dialogue with state actors, meaning that state institutions remain marginal; for example, 
instructing factories to reduce the proportion of contract workers that they employ without 
consulting state guidelines on contracting.  Even when transnational regulators require factories 
to interact with state regulators—for example, to verify an employment contract—such 
encounters tend to be superficial without political pressure to make institutions constrain 
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employer behavior.  Without worker mobilization, transnational regulators have minimal impact 
on the relevance of state institutions. 
While mobilization is central, alone it is insufficient to drive reinforcement.  When rules 
are contested and institutions weak, actors try to exploit vagaries in the way rules are applied, 
offering interpretations that align with their interests.  At times there may be genuine confusion 
about how the rules apply, but even when rules appear to be clear, actors can strategically 
generate competing views in order to advance their interests.  Such strategies are especially 
viable in contexts where enforcement is highly uneven.  In our case, workers can mobilize and 
gain  legal victories, but if transnational regulators simply adopt pro-employer interpretations 
that allow factories to maintain the status quo, reinforcement will not occur.  While the particular 
stakeholders of transnational initiatives vary, reinforcement requires that transnational regulators 
have authoritative support from their governing bodies to interpret contested rules in a way that 
forces firms into constraining state structures, instead of allowing them to remain disengaged. 
By emphasizing interpretation, we do not claim that conflict over labor institutions or 
non-adherence to the law is only a matter of differing, legitimate legal interpretation. Factories 
do knowingly violate laws. Instead, our point is that when contestation occurs, generally due to 
worker mobilization, political conflict often takes the form of workers and employers (and their 
respective allies in government) pushing different interpretations about how to apply rules on the 
books. Transnational regulators, including BWI, must decide how to interpret the local rules that 
they apply to their factories, which in turn impacts the potential for reinforcement. Thus, instead 
of focusing on whether or not the compliance criteria of transnational initiatives align with 
national laws, we instead highlight the way actors exploit institutional weaknesses to advance 
their interests, how transnational actors are forced to choose sides among these divergent 
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interests, and the problems that occur when interpretations that force firms into constraining 
institutions cannot be obtained.   
In sum, transnational initiatives will likely reinforce state institutions when two 
conditions jointly occur: mobilization from below to activate institutions and support for 
interpretations of rules that go against the status quo of institutional weakness and force 
employers to engage with constraining institutions. We make two contributions with this 
argument.  First, we advance the literature on transnational regulation by moving beyond 
describing interactions to accounting for variance, which is crucial to designing transnational 
initiatives that can promote longer-term improvements in labor conditions.  We do this by 
situating transnational regulation firmly in the local politics of the places where it operates, 
including accounting for worker agency. Second, scholars of advanced industrial economies 
have theorized that layering can drive institutional change, but these theories have not been 
widely used to analyze developing countries.  Our argument extends this work by highlighting 
the critical role of activation and interpretation in weak institutional contexts.  Ultimately, this 
contribution points both to how transnational regulation is influenced by local labor politics, and 
how it might help strengthen states’ capacity to regulate labor markets around the world. 
Better Work Indonesia 
The basic architecture of BWI is similar to that of many transnational initiatives.  
Indonesian factories opt into BWI’s regulatory program to appease global buyers.  Since its 
introduction in 2011, BWI has enrolled over 130 garment factories that employ approximately 
200,000 workers (one third of all garment workers).  Once factories join BWI, they are subject to 
compliance “assessments” and are provided with monthly “advisory” services by BWI staff 
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called “Enterprise Advisors” (EAs), which aim to improve factory compliance and 
competitiveness.  BWI reports the results of assessments and advisory sessions to buyers, who 
then put pressure on factories to improve conditions.  Thus, BWI derives its power from the 
buyers that support it, and exercises that power directly in factories.  
Going beyond this standard factory-level architecture, BWI inherited a unique tripartite 
governance system from the ILO. While all transnational regulatory structures are subject to 
political forces, these pressures tend to come primarily from global brands and labor groups.  By 
contrast, BWI is nationally embedded through its Project Advisory Committee (PAC) that 
includes the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (MOMT), employers, and unions. Of all 
its domestic stakeholders, the one most directly involved in BWI’s day-to-day operations is the 
MOMT in Jakarta. When BWI was first established, MOMT officials were worried that the 
program would cause labor unrest (G35), or “overlap with the duties of the labor inspectors” and 
displace the state (G3). BWI made an explicit effort to align its compliance assessment tool with 
Indonesian laws; BWI staff noted they did not “want to be seen like we are against the 
government or we have a different interpretation” (BW5). To coordinate, BWI and the MOMT 
set up an “Ad Hoc Committee” made up of staff from both organizations, which evolved into a 
permanent body that determines which interpretation of Indonesian labor law should guide BWI.  
As a result, it has de facto jurisdiction over the content of BWI’s compliance assessment criteria, 
which combine ILO conventions and domestic labor law. The committee meets frequently to 
examine problematic instances of non-compliance and clarify legal ambiguities that BWI 
encounters during factory visits. 
Through this relationship, BWI extends the MOMT’s power to influence regulatory 
compliance in garment factories. To illustrate with a minor issue, Indonesian factories sometimes 
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try to swap a holiday that falls in the middle of the work week with another working day closer 
to a weekend; when BWI encountered this practice, EAs were uncertain about its’ legality.  BWI 
consulted the Ad Hoc Committee, which declared “swap days” illegal.  BWI told factories and 
buyers that the practice would be coded as non-compliance (BW3, BW4, BW12), then proceeded 
to monitor the rule, as interpreted by the MOMT, in its factories.  
Although such interactions are positive, they do not constitute reinforcement. By 
applying state regulations in its factories, BWI directly contributes to compliance, but it does so 
without actually making factories meaningfully engage with the weakest part of Indonesia’s 
regulatory system: the local-level institutions that structure everyday labor relations.  Because of 
decentralization, local labor market institutions including inspection, dispute settlement and 
wage bargaining are overseen by district Manpower offices (Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi, or “Dinas” for short).  The Dinas report to district-level politicians, not the central 
MOMT. As a result, when BWI brings information about local institutional failures to the 
MOMT, decentralization prevents central state officials from intervening to correct them.  While 
this particular feature of Indonesia amplifies the influence of local politics, all central 
governments have difficulty controlling local officials who may choose not to implement 
regulations, and even within centralized bureaucracies, local officials have considerable 
discretion (Kuruvilla, Lee, and Gallagher 2011).  
Therefore, to understand reinforcement, we need to analyze how BWI might push 
factories to interact with state institutions in a way that actually forces them to follow the rules.  
First, as alluded to above, BWI can tie threats of penalties or rewards not only to meeting 
specific standards, but to actually follow the processes prescribed by the state.  Second, BWI can 
diffuse information about legal processes so that factory managers and unions have knowledge 
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about the formal rules of the game.  Third, BWI officials can coach managers through the 
process of engaging state institutions, serving as a broker for factories and reducing information 
costs for factories sorting out complex and shifting policies, especially when local officials are 
unreliable.  The first mechanism corresponds to factories defecting from institutions out of pure 
interest, not because of genuine ambiguity in institutional processes. The second and third 
mechanisms correspond to instances of unresolved ambiguities in rules, due either to actors self-
servingly amplifying conflicting interpretations to advance their interests or to genuine legal 
fuzziness.   
Research Methods 
This paper takes a mixed-method approach. It uses case studies to trace the processes by 
which BWI influenced factories’ actions, and statistically analyzes the association between BWI 
participation and factory behavior.  Our comparative design allows us to observe variation while 
holding constant national-level variables, such as the content of the laws.  The analysis uses data 
collected during fieldwork conducted in May through July 2014 and April 2015. Data sources 
include interviews with 189 factory managers, government officials, union leaders, BWI staff, 
and buyers, as well as BWI’s factory assessments and government records (Table 1).3 We also 
construct a factory-level dataset that allows us to undertake the first (to our knowledge) 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between a transnational initiative and engagement with 
state institutions.  While the dataset includes all districts with more than one enrolled BWI 
factory, our case studies focus on four districts.  To select these districts, we listed all 14 districts 
containing BWI factories, and eliminated those with fewer than six BWI factories.  We then 
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BU – buyer; BW – BWI; E – employers’ association; F – factory manager; G – government official; U – union.  
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stratified the remaining districts by levels of labor mobilization, our key district-level 
explanatory variable.  There were four districts—Bogor (kabupaten), Bogor (kota), Jakarta, and 
Tangerang (kabupaten)—with comparatively strong unions, as evidenced by substantial 
mobilization around minimum wages.  We eliminated Tangerang, where the number of BWI 
factories was declining, and selected Bogor (kabupaten), which had more BWI factories than 
Bogor (kota), and Jakarta.4  We also selected Semarang (kabupaten), a new garment-producing 
district with weak unions, to contrast with established industrial districts.  This left us with three 
districts in the middle of the distribution—Bandung, Sukabumi, and Subang—out of which we 
selected Subang because it had exhibited the strongest union mobilization.  
     [TABLE 1] 
To focus our analysis, we study fixed-term contracting and wage setting, two institutions 
that have recently became highly salient and contested in some parts of Indonesia.  As we will 
show in the following sections, fixed-term contracts present a negative case: BWI is not 
reinforcing the state. Union mobilization in one district, Subang, activated state institutions and 
created the opportunity for reinforcement, but MOMT did not provide BWI with an authoritative 
interpretation that forced factories into the constraining institutions, resulting in an absence of 
reinforcement. The case of fixed-term contracts shows that mobilization alone is not sufficient 
for reinforcement. The second case, supervised minimum wage renegotiations, is a positive one: 
BWI is reinforcing the institution, although only in districts with strong union mobilization. In 
this case, the MOMT provided an interpretation of the rules requiring factories to engage in the 
state structured process of renegotiation, which allowed BWI to take reinforcing actions.  This 
                                                
4 DKI Jakarta is a province, not a district, but it has jurisdiction over labor inspection and minimum wages, therefore 
we treat it as a “district” in our analyses. 
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case demonstrates that when the two conditions jointly occur, the outcome is reinforcement.  
Thus, combining both dimensions of variation—institutions and districts—we demonstrate that 
reinforcement only occurs in districts where mobilization occurs, and for rules on which MOMT 
provides an authoritative interpretation that forces factories to engage in constraining institutions.  
Approvals of Fixed-Term Contracts 
Employment contracts are contentious in Indonesia.  The Manpower Act (No. 13/2003) 
allows companies to use two types of employment contracts: permanent and non-permanent.  
Employers may hire non-permanent workers for up to three years (a two-year contract with a 
one-year renewal).  Factories use these fixed-term contracts for flexibility in hiring and firing, to 
avoid severance pay, and as a union avoidance tactic.  Although unions won new legal 
restrictions on precarious forms of employment in 2012, fixed-term contracts are still widely 
used and adherence to the legal limitations on their use is weak. BWI compliance data reveals 
that among the 109 factories assessed in 2013, the median factory had 47% of workers on fixed-
term contracts, and that 81% of factories had contract violations of some kind.  
The law restricts fixed-term contracts to specific types of positions, such as “seasonal” or 
“temporary” work.  To control their use, factories are required to register every new contract and 
to regularly submit the entire list of employment contracts to district labor offices for approval.  
Critically, the law does not specify whether workers in globalized industries subject to volatile 
demand are “seasonal,” allowing local regulators, buyers, employers and unions to promote 
different interpretations.  Some unions have claimed that garment work is continuous, so “all 
have to be permanent workers” (U12; also U15, U21).  Most mangers argue for minimal 
restrictions on contract use, pointing to the seasonality of fashion (F36, F25).  Buyers have 
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varied views, with some unilaterally prohibiting fixed-term contracts to minimize risk, and others 
allowing them (BU1, BU2, BU5, BU6). 
In principle, the contract registration procedure is a process institution that allows 
regulators to ensure that contracts are legally compliant. In practice, local officials exercise little 
oversight.  In Jakarta, Bogor, and Semarang, district manpower offices allowed factories to 
“manipulate the regulation,” in the words of one manager, by endlessly renewing temporary 
contracts (F7).  Regulators acknowledged abuses, yet they routinely approved contracts without 
consideration of legal eligibility (U16, G10, G12, G15, G18, G38). Even when the regulators 
identified violations like serial renewal, they rarely enforced the rules (G20).5  Factory managers 
widely reported that the “only challenge” for getting approvals was “illegal” payments from US 
$70 to $140 per 100 fixed-term contracts (F2, F34, F36, F71, F73, F74).  Recognizing that the 
process was corrupt, some brands stopped requiring contract registration (BU5).  Naturally, 
unions saw weak enforcement as problematic, but it was not the central focus of mobilization in 
Jakarta, Bogor, or Semarang, and the status quo prevailed (U15, U32). 
In the newly industrialized district of Subang, however, focused union mobilization 
succeeded in pushing local officials to tighten their regulation of contract use, thus triggering 
public contestation over fixed-term contracting.  The case began with small plant-level FSPMI6 
unions in two garment factories enrolled in BWI, which workers had formed in 2013 because of 
FSPMI’s reputation for militancy.  Management in one of the factories responded aggressively, 
terminating the FSPMI members, nearly all of whom were fixed-term contract workers (F7, U21, 
U22, U23).  FSPMI’s district branch brought the issue to local labor officials, arguing that the 
                                                
5 There are no legal penalties for violations of contract rules, leaving unions reliant on courts or political pressure 
(Caraway 2010). 
6 FSPMI is the metalworkers’ union, but it also organizes garment factories. 
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factories were abusing fixed-term contracts, and demanding that the contracts be converted.  
These officials initiated an investigation, finding the factories in violation of multiple contract 
rules (G31).  Regulators instructed one of the factories to convert the workers to permanent 
contracts, but the factory refused, and union members went on strike.  The Dinas then forwarded 
the case to the provincial industrial relations court of West Java.  FSPMI did not stop pursuing its 
case after formal institutional mechanisms had failed.  In early 2014, union members began to 
pressure local officials to ban fixed-term contract use in the garment industry by adopting a 
stricter legal interpretation.  Union leaders and regulators held a series of backroom meetings and, 
going beyond the specific cases of the two factories, unions seized on the ambiguity of the law to 
argue that garment production is “continuous” work, and should not qualify for fixed-term 
contract employment at all (U22, G30).  The push came at a moment of political opening: local 
protests over minimum wage in 2013 had been a show of force for the unions, and the newly 
appointed head of the Dinas was more sensitive to union demands than his predecessor (U12, 
G30). 
Overriding employers’ objections, regulators adopted the unions’ strict interpretation that 
garment factories could not use short-term contracts in core production positions. The Dinas 
sought legal clarification from the MOMT, then disseminated the favorable reply to union 
leaders (U21, F34) and issued a letter declaring that all fixed-term contracts must be re-registered, 
and that employers should either convert workers to permanent status or pay severance (G31, 
BW12, BW15).  A local official justified the position, arguing that garment work was clearly 
continuous: “The workers don’t suddenly switch to producing [a new product]” (G31). The 
Dinas stopped registering fixed-term contracts altogether. Regulators were subject to intense 
pressure from both sides: employers prepared a counterattack, appointing a former head of the 
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Dinas as the new head of the local employers’ association (E9, U12).  After the standoff, 
regulators ceded to pressure and began registering contracts again.  By June 2014, most factories 
were again able to register contract workers under the condition that they could demonstrate that 
the work was seasonal (for example, the extension of a certain style or addition of sewing lines to 
fill temporary increases in orders) (G17, G31, BW15, F39, F42, F55, F56, F57).   FSPMI, 
however, continued to pressure the Dinas, and the original two factories remained unable to 
register any fixed-term contracts.  Naturally, employers pushed back; one manger told the district 
mayor’s deputy that “if this continues, the factories will leave” (F55).  Still, the union 
successfully pushed front-line officials to enforce the strict interpretation in these two plants.  
While the case remained in court and unresolved as of April 2015, the stricter application of the 
rule had been in place for well over a year. 
How did BWI respond to widespread violations of Indonesia’s contract regulations? BWI 
took modest actions to prevent the worst abuses of fixed-term contracts, but did not take strong 
actions to reinforce the weak domestic institution.  Most basically, BWI required factories to 
register contracts as stipulated by law; but, as noted above, registering contracts without seeking 
strict enforcement tended to fuel corruption without substantially reducing abuse (F74, BU5, E1).  
Requiring factories to register their contracts did not constrain the types of contracts they could 
use (in three out of the four districts).  In the absence of institutional activation by unions, BWI’s 
steps to promote engagement with the state had little substance.  BWI encouraged factories to 
create a plan to gradually reduce the use of fixed-term contracts, attempting to secure compliance 
without making state institutions more relevant (BW12).  
While in other districts such practices could continue without controversy, the union 
victories in Subang complicated matters, while also creating an opportunity.  FSPMI’s 
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mobilization put pressure on local regulators, bringing in the state and building momentum 
towards change.  If BWI had pushed factories into local institutions, it is likely that they would 
have constrained behavior, given the very public position that local officials had taken. Instead, 
BWI did not use its factory assessment procedures in Subang to reinforce the unions’ local policy 
victory.  After a year and a half of conflicts over contracts, a local official stated that BWI should 
“help with enforcement” but had not done so (G31).  Local union leaders had hoped that BWI 
would support their victories, but were also disappointed (U22).  The factories continued to 
abuse the contract system, and lived in legal limbo, with the cases pending in court.  BWI staff 
described the issue as out of their hands (BW12). 
Why did BWI not reinforce the efforts of local regulators to strengthen oversight of 
fixed-term contract use?  In the districts without substantial union mobilization, BWI could 
encourage factories to get contracts registered, but that was not particularly effective because 
without public contestation, engagement with the state was reduced to corruption.  In Subang, 
contestation did create an opportunity for meaningful state oversight, especially in the two 
offending BWI factories.  Process tracing, however, reveals that the key barrier was the 
MOMT’s interpretation of the contracting rule.  When BWI brought the Subang case to the 
MOMT, central officials stated that the local government’s interpretation of the law was 
incorrect, but the MOMT did not provide a clear alternative interpretation (BW4, BW14). By 
giving BWI a vague interpretation of the rules that could not justify a larger intervention, the 
MOMT prevented BWI from pushing factories into the local regulatory system where unions had 
activated institutions.  When two parts of the state conflicted, BWI could not stay neutral.  The 
MOMT used the ambiguity to support the status quo but avoid publicly taking a pro-industry 
stance, and BWI had little choice but to follow its principal over the local officials.  The 
  
18 
counterfactual implied by this analysis—that if the MOMT had taken a different position that 
was both authoritative and required officials to constrain factory behavior, reinforcement would 
have occurred—is examined in the next case study.  
Minimum Wage Renegotiations  
BWI’s role in minimum wage renegotiations offers a counterpoint to the contract issue.  
The Manpower Act devolved responsibility for setting minimum wage to the districts and 
provinces.  The law created tripartite wage councils at both levels, consisting of local 
government officials, unions, and employer representatives. The councils conduct an annual 
“basic needs” survey based on a basket of goods to determine the local living wage, and make a 
recommendation to the district mayor or regent.  The mayor determines the final wage and 
presents it to the provincial governor, who generally accepts the local recommendation.7   
In districts facing large wage increases, however, many garment factories do not pay the 
full minimum wage.  Indonesian law allows factories in labor-intensive industries to pay below 
the minimum wage if they go through a supervised renegotiation with their workers. 
Renegotiations soften the blow of wage hikes by allowing for gradual increases over the course 
of a year.  To receive state approval to renegotiate wages, factories must obtain approval from at 
least half of their workers (or unions that represent half of workers) and submit to a financial 
audit conducted by the provincial labor administration.  This information goes to the provincial 
minimum wage council, where unions and employers debate the merits and make a 
recommendation to the governor, who then approves or rejects the results of the renegotiation.  
This process is intended to provide flexibility while also stopping employers from unilaterally 
                                                
7 The procedure differs somewhat in Jakarta.   
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imposing lower wages.  It also requires that companies pay at least the previous year’s minimum 
wage, ensuring that all factories raise their wages every year.  This regulation is controversial; 
many union leaders opposed the idea of any factory paying below minimum wage (although if 
there has to be renegotiation, union leaders argue that it should be done legally and without 
intimidation) (U32, U36).  Some buyers believe that renegotiations posed a reputational risk and 
did not accept them, while others allow factories to go through the renegotiation process, and 
still others only want evidence that factories had some sort of agreement with workers (even if 
the agreement was illegal) (BU1, BU2, BU6).   
In some districts, unions did not mobilize enough to force higher wages, and rules 
governing renegotiation were not activated.  In Semarang, for example, there were 
demonstrations around minimum wage, but these were relatively small (U8).  As a result, local 
minimum wages remained low, and, for many years, below the local living wage.8  Without 
pressure from steep increases, factories in Semarang did not go through the renegotiation process 
(G10); none of the five BWI factories we interviewed had gone through renegotiation.  In this 
context, there was no pressure put on state institutions, and BWI did not undertake broad actions 
to incentivize or instruct factories on how to undertake wage renegotiation.  Quite simply, the 
lack of mobilization gave BWI few opportunities to push factories to engage with institutions 
governing wages (BW14, BW16).  
Around Jakarta, however, minimum wages emerged as a focal point for labor 
mobilization, resulting in dramatic increases. Mobilization around minimum wage was not new 
in democratic Indonesia, but its growing intensity allowed unions to score major victories in 
                                                
8 All minimum wage figures in this section are from provincial or district labor office websites or sources. West Java 
data is from Evaluation Determination of Minimum Wage for Districts/Cities in West Java, 2014, courtesy of West 
Java Manpower Office.    
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2012 and 2013.  After a series of massive strikes and demonstrations, Jakarta and neighboring 
districts experienced large nominal year-on-year wage increases.  In Jakarta minimum wages 
increased by 47% to 2.2 million IDR (US $227), in Bogor by 57% to 2 million IDR (US $207), 
and in Subang by 57% to 1.58 million IDR (US $164) (Figure 1).9   From garment factories’ 
perspectives, these wage shocks posed a severe problem because they occurred unexpectedly, 
after prices had already been negotiated with buyers (F13, F43, F44). Some firms began scaling 
down their Jakarta-area factories, seeking lower-wage locations; but these moves took time, and 
firms needed short-term responses (F37, F38).  Regulations required factories in this situation to 
formally renegotiate wages with workers, which some did: for example, after the 2013 wage 
hike, 108 companies in Bogor renegotiated.   
FIGURE 1 HERE 
As with fixed-term contracts, however, many factories either violated the rules around 
minimum wages overtly or selected interpretations that suited their interests.  Instead of going 
through the formal process, factory managers opted for informal negotiations, which were 
allowed by local officials, posed fewer constraints, and resulted in lower wages. For instance, 
one buyer observed that suppliers go “under the table” to get agreements “to make it easy” and  
avoid the “very strict” formal renegotiation process (BU2; also BU1, F36).  District labor 
officials often condoned these illegal agreements, either to extract bribes or to avoid the risk of 
strict enforcement antagonizing footloose factories.  In Bogor, an inspector noted that “we should 
enforce the law, but we also understand that the vision of the district is to attract investors.” 
(G40).  In some cases, BWI officials found that factories had acquired letters “approving” illegal 
agreements from the local labor office or industrial relations courts (BW10) and “pretend[ed]” 
                                                
9 Exchange rates calculated for January of that calendar year. 
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that these documents were acceptable (BW13). In Jakarta, a factory manager said that “Some 
buyers don’t mind as long as you have a paper from the North Jakarta Dinas” (F74).  BWI staff 
observed that illegitimate approvals of informal agreements “become[] like a weapon from the 
factory” to justify wage levels to buyers, who demanded compliance with wage laws but did not 
understand the intricacies of legal requirements (BW12).  While many informal agreements were 
blatantly illegal, others skirted the edge of legality.  As factories shopped for favorable forums, 
they caused jurisdictional battles among parts of the state over who had the authority to allow 
factories to renegotiate minimum wages.  Overall, the number of factories paying below the 
minimum wages far outstripped the number that went through formal renegotiation.10 
 How did BWI respond to pressures put on minimum wage regulations? The problem of 
wage renegotiation mirrored that of fixed-term contracts, in which factories defected from state-
overseen processes with tacit approval from local regulators, and different actors put forward 
competing interpretations of the rules to serve their interests.  Given BWI’s governance 
structure, its staff once again turned to the MOMT to clarify the legal requirements (BW12).  
Unlike with fixed-term contracts, however, the Ministry gave BWI clear affirmative guidance 
that wage renegotiations should be conducted through the constraining formal process, with an 
audit and approval from the provincial governor.  Informal renegotiations, or renegotiations 
approved by district officials, were illegal.  Coming to this interpretation was not simple. There 
were various challenges to the details of wage renegotiation.  For example, in 2014, DKI Jakarta 
adopted a decree that changed minimum wages midway through the year, making it impossible 
for factories to go through the formal legal process of renegotiation; according to a BWI official, 
                                                
10 Industrial Manufacturing Survey data from 2012 shows that 19% of apparel factories in Jakarta, West Java and 
Banten districts with BWI factories self-reported average salaries for production workers below minimum wage—




“the factories were at the mercy of a system that didn’t work” (BW8).  In light of this abnormal 
policy change, the factories went to the industrial relations court and obtained a letter stating that 
they did not have to pay the full wage.  This action set off a jurisdictional conflict between the 
industrial relations court and the MOMT that took weeks to resolve, suggesting that there were 
indeed genuine differences in interpretation that were being used strategically (not only knowing 
violations of law).  Eventually, the MOMT won and set out guidelines that required formal 
renegotiation.  This support gave BWI the authority to contradict other officials who had 
endorsed factories’ practices.   
Specifically, BWI’s response to the institutional breakdown took three forms—incentives, 
information, and coaching factories.  First, BWI created incentives for factories to follow the 
rules through its standard assessment procedure.  Unlike some private auditors and brands, BWI 
did not accept factories’ questionable approvals; instead, it marked them as non-compliant and 
reported the findings to buyers.  Multiple factory managers said that they went through the 
supervised wage renegotiation process in order to remain compliant for BWI audits (F36; F43).   
Second, BWI brought reports of labor law violations to the MOMT from its on-the-
ground knowledge of happenings in factories, and it channeled the MOMT’s authoritative legal 
interpretations back down to buyers, factories, and local governments. One MOMT official said 
BWI was a “bridge” between the central government and the factories, and that “In any matters 
where communication can be done clearly and quickly, that is good” (G2).  In Indonesia’s 
decentralized system, BWI was a force multiplier, extending the MOMT’s reach.  With 
competing applications of the rules clarified multiple times by the MOMT, BWI circulated four 
detailed “Legal Updates” to factory managers and buyers, explaining the minimum wage setting 
and renegotiation processes and detailing how BWI evaluates minimum wage compliance in its 
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assessment.  BWI also spread information by organizing a “refresher” training with officials in 
offending districts, including Jakarta and Bogor, to “tell them what was wrong” (BW4).  Though 
BWI did not have the authority to directly intervene with local governments, it did facilitate 
information flow between central and local labor administrators, and between the MOMT and 
factories, about the correct legal process. 
Third, BWI coached factories through the process and received complaints from unions 
when managers attempted to use intimidation to renegotiate wages.  An example from one 
Korean-owned factory in North Jakarta illustrates BWI’s actions.  In 2014, Jakarta’s minimum 
wage increased to 2.4 million IDR (US $199) per month. Managers in this factory received 
guidance from the Korean Garment Association to pay 2.18 million IDR (US $181) a month. 
The managers went to their union and “explained” that “we cannot survive because there are 
many expense[s]” (F10). The management-controlled union was “silent” and readily agreed to 
the proposed wage level (F8).  This is exactly how informal institutions can exacerbate worker-
manager power imbalances: without a strong union, the absence of outside oversight makes 
negotiation completely lopsided.  The negotiation could have ended here, but BWI deemed the 
informal agreement unacceptable and told the factory to get the full approval from the governor 
(BW13).  Provincial officials audited the factory’s profits and production, and interviewed 
workers to see if they had been pressured to accept the lower minimum wage.  After reviewing 
the evidence, the provincial labor office required a higher wage than the factory had proposed.  
The factory then offered to pay 2.3 million IDR (US $191, 5.5% more than the initial proposal), 
which workers and the governor approved. 
In sum, union mobilization in some districts created the opportunity for reinforcement. 
The process began with union mobilization driving up wages.  Factories then exploited weakness 
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in local institutions and sought to avoid negotiating with workers in state structures that 
disadvantaged their interests.  BWI had the opportunity to push factories into these activated 
institutions, but it faced conflicting views of what the process should be.  When BWI found 
factories circumventing constraining institutions with local government support, BWI repeatedly 
asked the MOMT for its view of local authorities authorizing informal agreements.  Unlike for 
fixed-term contracts, MOMT exercised power by offering an interpretation that went against the 
status quo and mandated that factories must engage with the constraining formal renegotiation 
process, clearing the way for BWI to take actions that made the institution more relevant.  If the 
MOMT had not supported an interpretation that contradicted the actions of defecting factories, it 
is unlikely that BWI would have been able to take the actions that it did.  The state institutions 
that BWI pushed factories into had been politicized by union contestation, creating real 
constraints on factory behavior and driving wages above what they would have been. This 
outcome contrasted with fixed-term contracts, where BWI required factories to receive approvals 
from local offices, despite corruption in the approval process, but failed to press factories to 
engage when these processes actually became constraining in Subang.  The key difference was 
the absence an authoritative interpretation from MOMT against the status quo of non-
enforcement; by contrast, in the case of wage renegotiations, mobilization was coupled with an 
interpretation from MOMT that bucked the status quo, triggering reinforcement. 
Quantitative analysis  
A key observable implication of our argument is that one set of factories should be more 
likely than others to participate in supervised wage renegotiation: BWI factories in districts 
where unions activated institutions by mobilizing and winning large minimum wage increases.   
To reiterate, the factories that did not formally renegotiate wages likely did not simply agree to 
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pay higher wages; instead, many defected and choose processes that favored their interests— 
direct negotiation with workers, corrupt local approval or fiat—resulting in lower pay.  To assess 
the association between participation in BWI and supervised wage renegotiation, we assembled a 
dataset of 372 factories inside and outside of BWI using the 2014 edition of Indonesia's 
Industrial Manufacturing  Directory of large and medium manufacturing firms,11 adding a 
variable indicating whether or not surveyed apparel or knitwear factories had provincial 
government approval for supervised wage renegotiation in 2013 and 2014.  
Because BWI tends to enroll larger factories, the Directory sample contains a larger 
proportion of small establishments than the BWI sample (illustrated in Figure A1, online 
appendix). To create the best possible counterfactual for BWI factories, we trimmed the sample 
of non-BWI factories to include only factories with at least 500 employees (though results are 
similar using the full sample, shown in Table A2).  Summary statistics comparing BWI factories 
included in the Directory and non-BWI factories are presented below.12 The trimmed sample, 
including only large factories, counts 171 unique factories, each observed over two years. 
Even after removing small non-BWI factories, these data could clearly be subject to 
selection bias: participation in BWI is voluntary, and all participating factories are exporters that 
sell to major Western brands.  The Directory sample does not allow us to observe whether or not 
factories export, although we can partially address this issue by controlling for size.13  More 
generally, though, it is not clear exactly what type of bias should result from unobserved 
differences between BWI and non-BWI factories.  On the one hand, if BWI factories are 
                                                
11 Available on BPS website. We restrict the sample to districts with more than one BWI factory and available 
renegotiation data.  
12 Table A1 (online appendix) shows similar geographic distribution of BWI and non-BWI factories. 
13  The 2012 Industrial Manufacturing Survey shows that within BWI districts 78% of garment factories with over 
500 employees are exporters.  
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inherently more likely to comply with the law, they might be predisposed to engage with formal 
institutions, even absent BWI. On the other hand, though, Better Work factories tend to export to 
buyers exposed to reputational pressures, some of which required their Indonesian suppliers to 
forgo renegotiations and just pay minimum wage (F73).  In addition, BWI factories are likely to 
have higher margins because they export and sell to brand name buyers, making them more able 
to absorb wage increases without needing to renegotiate.  
[TABLE 2 ] 
The summary statistics (Table 2) show that supervised renegotiation is more prevalent 
among BWI factories (42%) than non-BWI factories (29%).  Within districts where unions 
mobilized and won year-on-year wage increases of 30% or more, the difference is even starker: 
half of BWI factories went through supervised renegotiation, as compared with 28% of non-BWI 
factories.  This result from the Directory sample is congruent with more comprehensive data on 
supervised wage renegotiation, obtained from provincial officials in West Java: in 2013 in Bogor, 
eight out of nine BWI factories applied for and received approval for wage renegotiation, and in 
2014 three-quarters of BWI factories formally renegotiated wages again.  This rate was 
significantly higher than for Bogor garment factories as a whole (43% in 2013 and 18% in 2014). 
To systematically analyze the relationship between BWI membership and participation in 
supervised wage renegotiation, we undertake a series of regressions, exploiting cross-sectional 
variation between BWI and non-BWI factories within the same districts.14 We subset the data 
into districts that had strong and successful union mobilization resulting in a 30% or greater 
year-on-year nominal minimum wage increase, and those that did not.  Supervised wage 
                                                
14 There is little entry into or exit from BWI during this period. 
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renegotiation is modeled as a function of BWI participation, factory size, year, industry code and 
district, and standard errors are clustered by factory to account for serial correlation, as each 
factory appears in the dataset twice (for 2013 and 2014). 
[TABLE 3] 
The results of OLS (Model 1) and logistic regression models (Model 3) indicate that in 
districts that experienced wage shocks, BWI participation is associated with a significant, 
positive increase in the likelihood of supervised renegotiation.  Substantively, Model 1 suggests 
that participation in BWI is associated with a 15% increase in the likelihood of supervised wage 
renegotiation.  Our argument anticipates that BWI should be associated with supervised 
renegotiation only where unions publicly contested wages and won significant wage increases.  
Results of Models 2 and 4 are consistent with this claim: in the absence of union mobilization, 
there is no relationship between BWI participation and renegotiations.  In sum, the coefficient on 
BWI is positive and both statistically and substantively significant for districts with wage shocks, 
and it is small and statistically insignificant in districts that do not experience wage shocks. 
Although our statistical analysis cannot alone support causal claims, in combination with 
the case studies it does provide further evidence of a positive relationship between BWI and 
factory use of supervised renegotiations.  The qualitative evidence illustrates how BWI 
encourages factories to go through supervised wage renegotiations by disseminating information 
and incentivizing compliance.  The quantitative analysis suggests that these mechanisms may be 
at work in the larger population of factories, and that this positive association is generalizable 
within the districts where BWI operates.  
Conclusion   
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Over the past two decades, transnational initiatives have been the central response to the 
challenge of improving labor standards in globalized industries. But these efforts do not 
transcend the domestic contexts in which they operate (Bartley 2011).  Rather, they layer 
alongside existing state institutions.  If transnational initiatives are going to be more than stopgap 
measures, they will need to be structured to reinforce state regulatory institutions.  Through a 
study of Better Work Indonesia, we have analyzed the politics of reinforcement.  First, we find 
that for some rules, and in some places, BWI reinforces the state.  The finding of positive 
interaction is largely congruent with studies of other countries that have uncovered 
complementarities (Amengual 2010; Coslovsky and Locke 2013; Locke, Rissing, and Pal 2012; 
Distelhorst, Locke, Pal, and Samel 2015), but we go further by showing how a transnational 
initiative can push factories into state institutions that effectively constrain behavior, thereby 
making them more relevant. 
Second, we show that reinforcement is more likely to occur when mobilization activates 
state institutions, politicizing the institution, pressuring officials and thereby creating real 
constraints on employer behavior. The instances of worker mobilization we highlight depart 
substantially from the type of transnational advocacy networks discussed in earlier literature on 
global labor standards: unions in Indonesia are directly targeting the state, not the buyers, and 
BWI is stepping in not to substitute for state failures, but to make domestic processes, activated 
by union pressure, more relevant.  This study brings both worker agency and the state back into 
the center of analysis.   
Third, we find that by itself, pressure by workers is insufficient because there is ample 
room for actors to advance their interests through different interpretation of the rules.  
Transnational regulators must respond to the interests of their key stakeholders in this process.  
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In the case of BWI, ILO involvement brought the central state and unions into the process, but 
including the state did not guarantee reinforcement because of the different interests inside the 
state.  Reinforcement only occurred when the MOMT took an authoritative position that clarified 
the rules of the game in a way that required substantive engagement with local institutions that 
restrain factories’ ability to violate workers’ rights.  
Taking stock of BWI and its relationship with various state institutions and domestic 
actors also raises a set of questions that we believe should shape the research agenda going 
forward.  For one, this case reveals the need to disaggregate the state when studying regulatory 
interactions.  When BWI failed to take strong actions on fixed-term contracts in Subang, it was 
not because of the typical modes of regulatory failure—lack of information about violations, lack 
of capacity, and so on.  Instead, one part of the Indonesian state itself conflicted with another.  
The Indonesian context, with its strong decentralization and fragmented unions, clearly enabled 
these conflicts, but even nominally centralized states often do not have internally consistent sets 
of rules. Yet, there have been few analyses of whether and how transnational actors choose 
which state institutions to reinforce when there are internal conflicts.   
In addition, our analysis reaffirms the need to study processes in addition to labor 
standards as a key outcome of interest. There is, of course, an imperfect relationship between 
reinforcing institutions and directly improve working conditions. Supervised wage renegotiations 
are particularly problematic because the fact they exist is, in some ways, in tension with the very 
process of setting minimum wages.  In essence, BWI was encouraging factories to gain legal 
exemptions from decisions made in the district wage councils, another arena of contestation.  
While renegotiations were less costly than paying the full minimum wage, they were more costly 
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than the informal agreements that were the most realistic counterfactual.15  Even if BWI 
encouraging factories to go through formal renegotiations reduced salaries (which is unlikely), 
participation in state institutions is still important.  With more factories engaging in supervised 
wage renegotiation, and with more attention paid to this regulation, actors are more likely to 
expect these particular rules and processes to matter, and to invest in either changing or 
maintaining them.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to say whether this will result in a long-
term behavioral change, or what the lasting institutional impact of BWI might be, but it is clear 
that without substantive engagement, state institutions will remain weak.  Therefore, we must 
analyze both the outcomes of labor standards and the processes that lead to them, because they 
shape the expectations that ultimately guide future matters of contestation between workers and 
management. 
 Beyond issues of labor standards in global supply chains, this analysis shows how 
theories of institutional change in advanced economies can be fruitfully adapted to the study of 
institutional strengthening in developing economies. Thelen and her coauthors argue that 
institutional change is a gradual process that unfolds as actors incrementally shift their behavior 
in response to new rules, interests, and circumstances.  Layering can “set in motion path-altering 
dynamics,” evidenced through small changes that accumulate over time to result in a 
fundamental shift (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  But while in advanced economies the focus is on 
layering as a process of gradual replacing one regime with another, we propose that layering a 
transnational regulatory system on top of a weak domestic one can actually strengthen the 
original set of rules by changing actors’ incentives and capabilities to comply, and by channeling 
contestation into the bounds of prescribed processes. In order for layering to be a catalyst for 
                                                
15 One possible objection is that BWI is simply “pro-employer.”  But BWI’s actions on other issues, including 
building safety permits, show that it has adopted interpretations resisted by factories. 
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institutional strengthening, an endogenous process of institutional activation through 
mobilization is necessary.  This finding has implications for policy areas beyond labor 
regulation: the layering of transnational and state regulatory institutions in areas including 
environmental regulation and social service provision has long raised concerns about negative 
impact on state capacity (Eberlein et al. 2014). What we suggest is that positive regulatory 
interactions are possible if transnational regulators require engagement with state processes; but 
that for such reinforcement to occur, these processes must impose a real constraint on actors’ 
behavior, an outcome which depends largely on domestic politics.   
Can lessons be drawn from the case of BWI to other transnational labor standards 
initiatives? Better Work is different from purely private initiatives because of its link to the ILO, 
which ties it closely to national governments.  However, our analysis shows that the formal 
relationship between BWI and the MOMT is not the main site of reinforcement—instead, the 
role of the state is as a governing stakeholder that selects the particular interpretations of the 
rules of the game that BWI implements in its factories.  In this way, BWI is typical, as all 
transnational regulators have governing stakeholders and are caught among multiple interests—
local and national governments, brands, factories, labor organizations—that seek to influence 
how abstract rules are applied in practice.  For example, studies of the FLA find that its corporate 
control limits broad application of freedom of association provisions (Anner 2012). New 
initiatives like the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh or the Alliance of 
Bangladesh Worker Safety vary greatly in the channels they create for actors to advance their 
own interpretations of the rules.  Some have stronger roles for unions, while others emphasize 
employers’ associations and central government officials. Each of these actors assigns different 
weight to factory engagement with local institutions.  When analyzing and designing these 
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initiatives, we must pay attention not only to how governance structures influence standards, but 
also to their potential for reinforcement, since these structures determine how inevitable conflicts 
over the rules of the game are resolved and whether they encourage engagement with the state.   
In addition, our findings show that institutional design alone is not decisive, as worker 
mobilization played a central role in activating institutions in Indonesia.  This suggests that 
transnational initiatives operating in countries with repressive labor relations will likely have few 
opportunities for reinforcement, no matter the governance structures.   As we better understand 
when and how reinforcement might occur, we can structure transnational initiatives to increase 
the likelihood that they will strengthen state regulation. Our hope is that this study is a step in 
that direction.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Table 1: Interviews16 







BWI 18 1 51 
MOMT 10 1 58 
 
Local governments  30 5 81 
Unions 36 6 87 
Factory managers 74 24 53 
Buyers 7 6 60 
Employers’ associations 11 2 72 
NGOs 3 3 71 
Total 189 48 72 
 
  
                                                
16 Interviews were conducted in English and Indonesian (through translators).  Some individuals were interviewed 
multiple times or in groups.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics on Direktori Industri Manufaktur (2014) 
 BWI  Non-BWI  
(>500 workers) 
All non-BWI  
Employment size 
(median) 
1492 920 283 
# factories (unique) 34* 137 338 
% with supervised 
wage renegotiation  
42% 29% 14% 
Main product    
% apparel  84% 91% 86% 
% knitwear 16% 9% 14% 
* Note: Six factories were only in BWI one year. The remaining 28 were in BWI for both years. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression results from subsetted analysis of factories with > 500 workers.  














No Wage Shock 
Logit 
BWI 0.153** -0.0692 1.643** -0.407 
 (.07) (0.103) (0.773) (0.618) 
Employees (100) 0.00446 0.00811* 0.0429 0.0471* 
 (0.00362) -0.0692 (0.0311) (0.0262) 
Intercept -0.194** -0.0692 -19.87*** -17.50*** 
 (0.0911) (0.103) (1.706) (1.583) 




















Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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17 Includes each factory in 2013 and 2014; because the Directory is only available for 2014, establishment size data 
is the same for each factory for both years.  














































Table A1: Number of factories by district, BWI and non-BWI garment factories18 
 BWI  Non-BWI (>500 workers) 
 2013 2014 2013 2014 
Bandung (kab.) 3 3 19 19 
Bandung (kota) 1 2 9 8 
Bekasi (kota) 0 0 5 5 
Bogor (kab.) 4 5 21 20 
Bogor (kota) 0 1 6 5 
Jakarta Utara 4 5 24 26 
Karawang  3 4 1 1 
Subang  1 1 1 1 
Sukabumi (kab.) 6 6 11 13 
Tangerang (kab.) 4 3 8 9 




                                                
18 Semarang is not included because wage renegotiation data is not available.  
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Table A2: Regression results from subsetted analysis of all factories.  


















BWI .174*** -.0150 1.3015** -0.310 
 (.0832) (.0988) (0.5375) (0.672) 
Employees 
(100) 
.0109*** .0130*** 0.0815** 0.0978** 
(.00266) (.0035) (0.02386) (0.0320) 
Intercept -.0304** -.278** -5.1247 -18.488 
 (.0419) (.121) (1.208) (1.501) 
Industry 
dummies  







Yes Yes Yes 
N= 421 329 418 236 





                                                
19 In addition to subsetting the data by whether or not a wage shock has occurred, minimum wage shocks could also 
be operationalized as a variable indicating the absolute or percentage wage increase in each district-year. But the 
data includes only 13 districts and two years, or a total of only 26 observations to which one of the key independent 
variables is assigned. Because of this limitation, we present only the subsetted specification 
